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ITSim is a newly developed agent-based simulation 
environment designed to analyze operations within the 
broader range of tasks of the Federal Armed Forces, the 
Bundeswehr.
Modern warfare scenarios are dominated by asymmetric 
threats with complex non-linear interdependencies and 
interrelations that traditional techniques of analysis are 
insufficient to capture. For example, it is often hard to 
determine whether located humans are opponents (Red) or 
just civilians (neutral). This distinction can often only be 
made, when suspicious behavior is observed. Especially, 
when protecting a base, the response time to suspicious 
behavior is important to prevent attacks.
The investigated scenario analyses exactly that aspect by 
using 3D terrain provided by the German Armed Forces.
One of our goals is to investigate the influence of the 
given terrain. The expectation without terrain is that the red 
units can be detected as soon as they start to prepare their 
missile attack. If the terrain data base is used we expect areas 
in which the opponents cannot be detected, e.g. in a valley. 
Thus, the existence of opponents can only be determined after 
they have started the attack by detecting the trajectory. The 
second goal is to analyze the efficiency of different base 
defending strategies, which will be defined later on. 
SCENARIO
Figure 1 depicts a possible excerpt of the investigated 
scenario. A blue base is located in 3D terrain. Dark regions 
mark high terrain elevation whereas bright areas denote lower 
terrain elevation. Thus, the blue base is located on a hill. It is 
protected by four guard towers. Two additional towers 
equipped with cameras are used to observe the surrounding 
area. They are visualized by tactical icons in the upper part of 
figure 1. During the course of the scenario, some Red will 
approach the base in order to attack it with ballistic weapons. 
Depending on the strategy, a blue unit will try to prevent the 
attack as shown in figure 1. 
The key idea is that the opponents cannot be detected as 
Red until they start to prepare their attack. Thus, the whole 
approach time cannot be used to prevent the attack. After the 
configured preparation time, the opponents launch n missiles 
and flee afterwards.
Figure 1: Base in 3D terrain
The scenario’s analysis is divided into two phases. The 
first one is a static classification and the second one is a 
simulation capturing the dynamics of the strategies.
Static Classification
Before the scenario is simulated dynamically, a static 
classification is performed. Two important measures are vital 
for the strategies: ballistic threat and line-of-sight. Areas 
from which the base can be attacked by ballistic weapons are 
called ballistically threatening. The muzzle velocity of the 
weapon defines its maximal distance. The terrain defines if 
there exists an angle that results in a flight trajectory such 
that the base is hit. The line-of-sight denotes which areas can 
be observed by the cameras in the base. These cells are called 
observable. Note that both measures strongly depend on the 
given terrain: if there is none, every point inside a maximal 
sight range is visible and any point between a given minimal 
and maximal shoot range is ballistically threatening.
In order to perform the classification, the area around the 
base is gridded. Afterwards, every cell, i.e. grid element, is 
checked if it is ballistically threatening and observable. Note 
that the terrain itself is not gridded but based on precise 
vector data. According to that classification, three cases exist:  
• A cell is not ballistically threatening, i.e. the base 
cannot be attacked from that cell. The Blue don’t have 
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to worry about that cell. Therefore, the cell is colored 
green.
• A cell is ballistically threatening and not observable. 
Thus, the base can be attacked from that cell and there 
is no line-of-sight to the base. The attackers cannot be 
identified while they prepare their attack. This is the 
worst case for the blue forces and the cell is colored 
red.
• A cell is ballistically threatening and observable. Thus, 
the base can be attacked from that cell and there is a 
line-of-sight to the Blue. The attackers can be detected 
while they prepare their attack. The cell is colored 
yellow.
The result of the classification of the base-case scenario is 
depicted in figure 2. Each grid cell has an edge length of l1 m 
resulting in 12,315 cells. 38.9% of the cells are green, 26.8% 
yellow and 34.3% red. Considering the ballistically 
threatening cells, only, the majority is not observable. This 
classification is the base for the simulation.
Figure 2: Result of Classification
Simulation of the Strategies
Our second goal is to evaluate different blue strategies 
against a given red behavior. This kind of analysis may give 
interesting hints to support the defending of the base. The 
red strategy is fixed in all experiments. It consists of the 
following steps:
5. Generation: the units are generated uniformly 
distributed outside the base. Their affiliation is 
neutral, i.e. they cannot be detected as hostile.
6. Approach: a yellow or red cell (i.e. a ballistic attack 
is possible from that cell) is selected and moved to. 
The unit is still not detectable as hostile.
7. Preparation: two cases exist. If the attacker can 
detect any blue unit it gets discouraged and flees. 
Otherwise it starts to prepare its attack. From that 
point in time, it can be detected as hostile by the 
Blue. As soon as a blue force is detected by the red 
unit, it aborts its preparation and starts to flee. 
Thereby note that the cameras’ sight range is much 
higher than the one for regular ground troops 
including red attackers and blue defenders. For our 
experiments, we assume a preparing time of five 
minutes.
8. Attack: the Red starts to fire a previously defined 
number of projectiles at the base. From this point in 
time, the attacker is detected as hostile by the blue 
defenders if it has not already been. Between the 
shots, the attacker has to reload. Afterwards, it flees.
The two Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) of this scenario 
are: The primary one is the number of prevented shots at the 
base. This happens if the attacker is neutralized or 
discouraged before the attack is started. The secondary MoE is 
the number of neutralized attackers. 
Currently, the Blue have three different strategy options 
to prevent ballistic bombardment at their base:
• Pursue  from Base  (PfB): a  blue Quick Reaction Force 
(QRF) is located inside the base and pursues as well as 
attacks the Red as soon as they have been detected. 
The attacker can be observed by the cameras or they 
reveal themselves by shooting projectiles at the base.
• Camouflaged Emplacements (CE): camouflaged spotters 
are located outside the base. They can detect the Red 
but not vice versa. As soon as the red units are located, 
their position is reported to the base and the QRF 
starts the counterattack at the Red.
• Show of Forces (SoF): patrols move around the base. 
They can detect the Red and can also be detected by 
these. If any red force is located, the nearest patrol 
starts a counter attack. Note that there is no QRF in the 
base as in the other strategies. If the Red detect any 
approaching patrol, they flee.
Figure 3 shows the classification of the strategy CE, 
where two emplacements are located in the valley. The circles 
denote their maximal sight range. Many cells inside these 
circles turned yellow since they became observable. The green 
cells remain unchanged since the ballistic threat depends on 
the terrain, only. 34.2% of the cells are yellow and 26.9% red. 
This is an improvement of about eight percent. The majority 
of the ballistically threatening cells are observable by the Blue.
The initial situation of strategy SoF is as follows: two 
patrols are located in the valley. The first one patrols between 
two waypoints northward of the base. The second one patrols 
southward. The QRF is no longer inside the base, because the 
patrols can pursue and attack the Red directly.
Note that the camera towers inside the base always 
support the detection of the Red. As mentioned above, the red 
units can only be detected after they have started preparing 
their attack. The QRF has limited time to reach the attackers 
before they can fire their rockets. 
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Figure 3: Classification of CE
We expect the following results having strategy PfB as 
basis for our comparison:
CE:  when the emplacements are positioned such 
that a large area becomes visible that has not 
been before (e.g. many cells turn from red to 
yellow), more attacks can be prevented since 
the QRF  can act earlier. Thus, we expect more 
success for the Blue.
SoF:   if the patrol points are selected wisely, the 
patrols can also cover many of the invisible 
cells and attack the Red earlier. Another 
advantage is that the distance from the patrol 
to the red attackers might be shorter than the 
one from the base to the Red. A third positive 
effect for Blue is that the Red might have to 
flee more often since they can detect the 
patrols by themselves and get discouraged. 
Thus, we expect this strategy to be the best.
The influence of omitting the terrain (i.e. the whole area 
being flat) on the three strategies is expected as follows:
PfB:  the success rate will rise since the red units can 
always be detected as soon as they start to 
prepare their attack. Thus, the QRF always has 
the maximum time for its reaction. Note that 
this does not necessarily mean that the attack 
can always be prevented.
CE:  this strategy will not improve the MoE of PfB 
since it only enlarges the visible area that is 
already maximal anyway (the cameras’ sight 
range is larger than the range of the red 
ballistic weapons). Thus, we expect similar 
results as for PfB.
SoF:   the advantage of the enlarged visible area 
drops since the whole area is visible.  But the 
advantage of discouraging the Red stays. 
Additionally, the approach distance to the 
attacking enemies might be shorter since the 
patrols are outside the base. Thus, we expect 
this to be the best also if the terrain is omitted.
We present the analysis of our results in the following 
section.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
As already mentioned in the introduction, we want to 
investigate two main questions during the evaluation of this 
scenario: 
• What is the influence of the terrain? 
• How effective are the different strategy options of the 
blue base defenders? 
To answer these questions, we have determined a 
primary and a  secondary MoE. The former one is the 
percentage of prevented attacks and the latter one is the 
number of neutralized attackers.
We have performed more than 170,000 simulation runs 
with different parameter variations. The variation covers the 
terrain, the velocities of the Red and Blue, as well as the 
different strategies.
Influence of the Terrain
In order to determine the terrain’s influence on our MoE, we 
have evaluated the strategy PfB with blue velocities b1, b2 
and b3 km/h as well as red velocities of r1, r2, r3 km/h, 
respectively. All nine experiments were performed with and 
without terrain resulting in 18 experiments.
Table 1 contains the results of the strategy Pursue from 
Base. We can easily confirm that both MoEs prevented shots 
and prevented all shots do not depend on the velocity of the 
Red since the variation caused by the red velocity is less than 
one percent given the blue speed. 







b1 km/h r1 km/h 21.02 % 18.14 % 57.79 %
b1 km/h r2 km/h 20.96 % 18.14 % 40.07 %
b1 km/h r3 km/h 21.02 % 18.14 % 36.89 %
b2 km/h r1 km/h 26.17 % 21.06 % 75.37 %
b2 km/h r2 km/h 26.16 % 21.05 % 53.05 %
b2 km/h r3 km/h 26.09 % 20.96 % 46.09 %
b3 km/h r1 km/h 31.10 % 25.32 % 86.21 %
b3 km/h r2 km/h 31.10 % 25.32 % 65.50 %
b3 km/h r3 km/h 31.10 % 25.32 % 51.82 %
Table 1: PfB with terrain
This can be explained by considering that a shot can only 
be prevented if the Quick Reaction Force arrives at the 
attacking unit while it is preparing its attack or if the Red 
recognizes a blue unit during its preparing phase. Clearly, the 
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former event only depends on the blue velocity while the 
latter one does not depend on any velocity. However, the red 
velocity is important for  our secondary MoE, since the 
number of neutralized attackers significantly rises when the 
Red get slower or the blue defenders become faster. The 
reason is simply the fact that more attackers are able to escape 
when they are faster.
Note the difference between prevented shots and 
prevented all shots: the former one denotes the number of 
prevented shots, whereas the latter one denotes if the base 
attack has been prevented completely throughout one 
simulation, i.e. if the red attacker has been discouraged or 
neutralized while it was preparing its attack. Thus, the latter 
one is a more strict measure. This explains why its percentage 
is less then prevented shots in all variations and strategies.





b1 km/h 48.15 % 46.85 % 84.58 %
b2 km/h 64.84 % 61.83 % 93.78 %
b3 km/h 78.76 % 74.67 % 98.29 %
Table 2: PfB without terrain
Table 2 contains the results of strategy PfB without 
terrain. Since the red attacker can be seen as soon as it starts 
to prepare its attack, the blues success is significantly 
superior. Note that this does not result from a better strategy 
itself but it is just the lack of realism that raises Blue’s success. 
The average gain factor of prevented shots and prevented all 
shots is about 2.5. The number of neutralized attackers is also 
higher in all cases than without terrain as can be seen in table 
1. We compared the influence of the terrain only with respect 
to the strategy PfB. This is sufficient since it is clear  that the 
terrain has an influence. We can quantify this influence with 
respect to our two MoEs. 
However, the terrain’s influence can also be seen by the 
static classification discussed above. If there is no terrain, 
there exists no red cell, i.e. no cell is ballistically threatening 
and not observable at the same time. The number of green 
cells decreases from 3,299 to 2,273 since all cells can be 
attacked within the given minimal and maximal range of the 
ballistic weapons (defined by its muzzle speed).  All 
remaining 10,042 cells are yellow compared to 4,215 yellow 
cells if terrain is given. Thus, the static classification also 
supports the claim that there is a significant influence of the 
terrain.
Of course, this quantification is limited to this scenario 
with this strategy. But in the real world there is terrain and we 
cannot simply omit it in data-farming since this distorts the 
analysis significantly. The results of the strategy comparison 
are presented next.
Comparison of the Strategy Options
We run the scenario with all three different strategies. 
Each run was performed with terrain and the same velocity 
settings for the units as above: b1, b2 and b3 km/h for blue 
defenders and r1, r2 and r3 km/h for red attackers. Table 1 
from above provides the results for the strategy PfB, which 









b1 km/h 23.24 % 19.00 % 54.06 %
b2 km/h 31.19 % 23.75 % 69.04 %
b3 km/h 37.89 % 29.32 % 76.26 %
Table 3: Results of strategy CE
Table 3 shows the results of the second strategy 
Camouflaged Emplacements. Similarly to PfB, the red velocity 
is not important for the MoEs prevented shots and prevented 
all shots. Due to the earlier detection in the areas that are 
covered by the spotters (see figure 3), the blue QRF can start 
earlier. Since the number of yellow cells rises from 26.8% to 
34.2% because of the additional spotter (see figures 2 and 3), 
one might expect that the primary MoE also rises by eight 
percent. This is not true. The MoE rises with respect to the 
blue velocity. If blue moves with b1 km/h, the MoEs 
prevented shots and prevented all shots rise by 2 and 0.8 
percent, respectively. When the blue speed is b2 km/h the 
MoEs rise by 5 and 2.5 percent, respectively.  The largest gain 
occurs if the blue speed is b3 km/h: 6 and 4 percent, 
respectively. The reason therefore is the distance between the 
base and the additional observable cells (see figure 3). The 
distance is so large that the QRF cannot prevent all attacks 
although it starts earlier. The faster the QRF moves, the more 
attacks can be prevented. 
The gain of strategy CE with respect to the MoE 
neutralized attackers compared to PfB is linear. Roughly 9 
percent more attackers are neutralized than with strategy PfB. 







b1 km/h r1 km/h 67.35 % 64.95 % 68.31 %
b1 km/h r2 km/h 69.22 % 66.18 % 64.01 %
b1 km/h r3 km/h 71.63 % 68.74 % 58.55 %
b2 km/h r1 km/h 73.88 % 70.81 % 67.27 %
b2 km/h r2 km/h 72.91 % 70.27 % 68.05 %
b2 km/h r3 km/h 74.84 % 72.19 % 65.28 %
b3 km/h r1 km/h 82.11 % 78.97 % 62.55 %
b3 km/h r2 km/h 78.17 % 74.88 % 69.38 %
b3 km/h r3 km/h 78.35 % 75.04 % 68.47 %
Table 4: Results of strategy SoF
The results of the last investigated strategy Show of 
Forces can be seen in table 4. First of all, we notice that the red 
velocity has influence on the MoEs prevented shots and 
prevented all shots. However, the blue velocity dominates the 
red one, i.e. the higher the blue velocity is, the superior are the 
MoEs. The faster the Blue move, the larger is the area they can 
observe in a  certain time frame. Additionally, they can reach 
an observed red attacker in shorter time. If the blue speed is 
constant, the red velocity has an influence on the MoEs, but 
there is no unambiguous trend. The reason therefore is the 
timing of the parallel movements of the red attackers and the 
blue patrols. For example, if the velocities are set such that a 
blue patrol prevents an attack by discouragement, a faster  as 
well as a slower red attacker might not be discouraged or 
might be detected later or earlier.
Another interesting result is the reason for the high 
percentages of prevented attacks. The number of attackers 
29 - IDFW 18 - Team 8
that got discouraged before they started the preparing of their 
attack is much higher in this strategy as can be seen in table 5.




Table 5: Percentage of Prevention by Discouragement
Prevention of Discouragement denotes the percentage of 
the discouraged red attackers, i.e. the ones that detect a  blue 
immediately before starting their preparation, with respect to 
all attack preventions. This rate is low and similar  for the 
strategies PfB and CE. But it rises dramatically in strategy SoF. 
Thus, the main reason for its success is that the Red can detect 
the blue patrol and flee before they attack. Transferring this 
result to reality might become difficult since no one can count 
this number. Thus, in reality this strategy might be 
underestimated, because the correct MoE cannot be 
determined in the real world. 
Summary of the Results
Figure 5  depicts a summary of the MoE prevented all 
shots  with all strategies. Comparing PfB with terrain, CE and 
PfB without terrain, we can see that the blue velocity is more 
important if more cells can be observed. The following 
statements can be derived by our analysis:
• Terrain information has a huge impact on the 
investigated MoEs. This statement is supported by the 
static classification as well as the simulation of the 
strategy PfB. Thereby note that the strategy PfB 
without terrain has a higher MoE than PfB with terrain 
and CE. Only SoF is superior. The main reason is the 
high rate of discouraged enemies.
• Camouflaged Emplacements help to raise the success of 
the blue defenders in comparison to PfB due to an 
enlargement of the observable area. The Blue have to 
assure that these additional yellow cells can be 
reached in time by the QRF in order to realize the 
potential advantage. The impact of emplacements is 
supported by the classification and simulation.
• Show of Forces is the best strategy option. It 
outperforms all other strategies, even PfB without 
terrain. The main reason is the fact that it is able to 
discourage the attackers before they start their 
preparing.
Given these results some common hints for the defenders 
can be derived. Due to the success of SoF it might be useful to 
substitute camouflaged emplacements by visible 
emplacements that can also discourage the enemy. It is 
important to note that the number of discouraged attackers 
cannot be determined in reality. Another option is to raise the 
speed of the QRF, e.g. by using helicopters instead of ground 
troops.
Limitations of the Strategy Comparison
The performed strategy comparison is just a starting point. 
Basically, one instance of each strategy has been evaluated. 
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Figure 5: Summary of Results
This is useful if several existing strategies have to be 
compared with each other. 
With the help of the static classification, we would like to 
answer the following questions in future:
• How many emplacements are needed to cover all 
cells? 
• How can n emplacements be distributed such that 
most cells are covered? 
• What is a good ratio between covered cells and used 
emplacements?
The first question is academic since there will not be 
enough resources available in practice. But it gives an upper 
bound for the resource planning. The answer to the second 
question requires an optimization of the application of 
available resources. The third question is very interesting if 
there is a base protection to be planned. We expect a double 
bend curve if we map the emplaced units to the covered cells. 
Then, there would be a point from which any additional 
emplacement merely raises the number of observed cells.
Analogously, the answer to the following questions could 
be given using the strategy simulation:
• How many emplacements/ patrols are needed to 
avoid any attack? 
• How can n emplacements/ patrols be placed such that 
most attacks are avoided?
• What is a  good ratio between avoided attacks and 
used emplacements/ patrols?
These questions are very similar to the ones above. But 
note that their answering is much more complex since the 
dynamics (especially the movement of the Red) have to be 
captured. Additionally, a patrol cannot simply be placed at a 
certain coordinate but its waypoints related to the arrival 
times are also important.
In order to answer these questions at least semi-
automated, we have to extend our current approach with 
optimization techniques which are able to derive strategy 
settings automatically. Such a system could use evolutionary 
algorithm combined with data-farming similar to Automated 
Red Teaming (ART) and Automated Co-Evolution (ACE).
Another limitation of the performed analysis is the 
restricted variation of the parameters. We just changed the 
velocity of the units and the position of the attackers. 
Additional parameters can be varied in order to confirm the 
analysis. These parameters are sight range for the camera 
towers and standard units, number of attackers and 
defenders, initial position and waypoints of the blue patrols, 
range of the weapons of Red and Blue, duration of the attack 
preparation of the red attackers, reload time of defenders and 
attackers, number of shots of the Red before their fallback, etc. 
Considering all these parameters, the number of required 
experiments grows exponentially.
CONCLUSIONS
The presented analysis is a first approach of incorporating 
terrain information into our agent-based simulation system 
ITSim. It enables the analysis of many interesting and 
promising scenarios that might give some decision-support 
to leaders of the German Armed Forces. Especially the 
possibility to evaluate different strategies under real-world 
constraints is an enormous step into that direction.
As expected, the terrain information complicates the base 
defending task for the blue forces. But it is vital to consider all 
parameters that influence the MoE of given scenarios 
significantly. A realistic model of scenarios is important for the 
transfer of gained knowledge to the real application.
From an analytic point of view, military operations are 
highly non-linear processes in which a wide variety of factors 
can have an impact on what is going to happen. Even small-
scale decisions can have serious effects and cause an operation 
to take very different courses. The key to success is the 
appropriate modeling of the planned operation. To achieve 
this, the model must be scaled such as to generate sufficiently 
general statements that are valid for a wide range of 
operations. Thus, a satisfactory analysis of the blue strategies 
is future work since several parameters of each strategy (e.g. 
number of units, position of units/ waypoints etc.) have not 
been investigated yet. We only have analyzed one 
representative of the strategies CE and SoF, respectively, since 
only one number of units and one patrol way have been 
investigated. Note that PfB can be considered as sub-strategy 
of SoF, because there is only one patrol that is placed inside 
the base. The reason for this insufficient analysis is the 
required computing power. Over 170,000 simulation runs 
have been performed after the workshop in order to generate 
the presented results. During the workshop, we were able to 
perform several hundred runs per design point, only. We 
calculated two design points for the strategy CE and omitted 
SoF completely.
Additionally, other strategy options for the blue forces 
can be imagined, e.g. a mixture of the strategies CE and SoF. 
The red strategy can also be changed although we consider it 
as very plausible and realistic. A change of a unit’s behavior is 
quite simple to manage since ITSim is designed to provide the 
best possible support to the modeler and therefore has a 
completely agent-based structure. All the entities of the 
simulation (terrain, units, technical elements, weather, 
communication, etc.) are simulated by autonomous agents. 
This technology provides the possibility to adapt the system 
to the requirements of the given operation model in spatial 
(cancellation of the operation area, aggregation of units), 
temporal (time model) and functional terms (behavior of 
units, technical and environmental elements). The scaling of 
the model can be adjusted to the simulation runtime so that 
uninteresting phases can be simulated in time lapse mode or 
low resolution. Additionally, all behaviors of the agents are 
built following a service-oriented approach. Thus, the 
existing services can be reused when developing new 
strategies.
Another future work might be the development of a 
system similar to Automated Red Teaming (in this case Blue 
Teaming) and Automatic Co-Evolution (ACE) aiming in 
automatic evaluation and comparison of the different 
strategies. One core requirement for such a system is the 
integration of experiment design, cluster control and result 
analysis. Additionally, the strategies (technically: parameter 
variations) must be guided heuristically in order to avoid a 
possibly infinite search.
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